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The American Law Institute's new Restatement of the
U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration is only
barely underway, and the reporters began with a chapter, on
the recognition and enforcement of awards, that should represent for them a comfort zone of sorts within the overall
project. Yet already a number of difficult, and to some extent
unexpectedly difficult, questions have arisen. Some of the difficulties stem from the very nature of an ALl Restatement project.1 Others stem from the nature of arbitration itself and,
more particularly, from the inherent tension between arbitral
and judicial functions in the arbitration arena. Still other difficulties-some of them the least expected-reflect what I
* Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law & Walter Gellhorn Professor of
Law, Columbia Law School.
1. On ALI Restatement projects in general, see Kristen David Adams,
The American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo's Ministry of Justice?, 32 So. ILL. U.
L.J. 173 (2007) (exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the American
Law Institute in a comparative analysis to justice Cardozo's vision for a Ministry ofJustice) and N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the
Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAw & HIST. REV. 55 (1990) (examining the origin of the American Law Institute).
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might call the "internationality" of this particular project. 2 It is
the latter difficulties that chiefly occupy me in this paper.
I.

BACKGROUND ISSUES

Of course, any Restatement worth producing, because it
falls within an area of the law needing clarification, simplification, and-at least on the margins-improvement, presents intellectual challenges. It is easy in a paper that focuses, as this
one does, on the special challenges that commercial arbitration's international character poses for the task of restating
the law in that field to overlook the presence of problems having little or nothing to do with that character. But, of course,
not all the difficulties confronting the Restatement are due to
the subject's international character. It may be useful at the
outset to indicate, by way of illustration, some problems already raised by the Restatement that are traceable more to the
fact that the project concerns arbitrationthan that it concerns
internationalarbitration.
Scope of the Submission to Arbitration. How far may parties
go in building legal content into the notion of the "scope of
the submission to arbitration"? May, for example, the exclusion in a contract of a particular form of damages for breach
be considered as raising a matter of "scope," so that if the arbitrators, notwithstanding the prohibition, proceed to award
such damages, that portion of the award may be vacated or
denied enforcement as lying "beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration"?3 Should it matter in this regard whether
the exclusion is contained in the arbitration clause itself,
rather than in a separate and independent contractual
4
clause?
By way of further example, may a provision in an arbitration clause directing the tribunal to make a "true and correct"
2. For a discussion not only of the history of ALI projects, but of the
trend in ALI projects toward "transnational work," see Lance Liebman, The
American Law Institute: A Model for the New Europe?, in MAKING EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAw 209 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Horatio Muir-Watt eds., 2008).
3. The leading cases confronting this issue include Parsons& Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier,508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1974) and Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948
(S.D. Ohio 1981).
4. This issue appears not to have been squarely decided in any judicial
opinion.
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application of the chosen law properly be considered as an aspect of "scope," so that if the tribunal errs in its application of
law, it will have exceeded the scope of its authority, thus rendering the award, to that extent, subject to annulment and unenforceable?5 Courts will want to be attentive to the risk of
thereby circumventing Hall Street Associates' bar against expanded judicial review of awards 6 under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 7 and, more generally, of entering impermissibly into the realm of merits review. The restaters will have to
establish some standards for ensuring that the notion of
"scope of the submission to arbitration" is not manipulated to
the point that the benefits associated with arbitration, as compared to litigation, are forfeited.
Arbitrability. The question of statutory non-arbitrability
has become mostly academic in the United States since the
federal courts have deemed virtually every statutory cause of
action to be arbitrable. 8 This of course could change under
certain amendments to the FAA currently under consideration
in Congress. 9 Even apart from that, unexpected questions
about arbitrability, in this strict sense of the term, have arisen.
For example, is non-arbitrability, as a ground for denying recognition or enforcement, to be determined in accordance
with the specific statutory claim (e.g., the Sherman Act) being
advanced or, instead, with the whole subject matter field (antitrust) within which the claim falls? If a statutory claim were to
be deemed non-arbitrable, would that mean only that arbitrators may not entertain causes of action based upon that stat5. In all likelihood, such a provision would be treated as an impermissible attempt to heighten the standard of review of arbitral awards under the
FAA as proscribed by the Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C.v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008) ("[T]he FAA confines
its expedited judicial review to the grounds listed in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and
11 .. .").
6. See supra note 5.
7. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (2009)
[hereinafter FAA].
8. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 767-72
(2009). For only the most recent example coming from the Supreme Court,
see 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1496 (2009) (holding a provision in
a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably calls for arbitration of disputes under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act enforceable as a matter of federal law).
9. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Congress (2009).
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ute, or would it also mean that they may not entertain a defense to a breach of contract claim insofar as the defense is
predicated on a breach of that statute? Moreover, we may assume that whether a claim is arbitrable or not, in this narrow
sense of the term, represents a question of law as to which a
court is to exercise fully independent judgment. But we increasingly encounter statutory causes of action that a legislature has declared "conditionally arbitrable," that is to say, arbitrable only subject to certain safeguards)10 The agreement to
arbitrate may by statute need to be separately signed or
printed in a certain size font, or may be enforceable only if a
consumer has not repudiated the agreement within a specified
cooling off period. Does the question whether these conditions have been satisfied have a powerful enough factual component to justify showing a certain degree of deference on the
matter to an arbitral tribunal that may already have addressed
it, even if arbitrability is ordinarily a purely legal question on
which no judicial deference to the arbitrators is owed?
FederalPreemption. Federal legislation all too often fails to
indicate with clarity its intended preemptive effect vis-A-vis
state law, and more should probably not be expected from an
old and inadequate statute like the Federal Arbitration Act.
According to the greater weight of authority, the FAA does not
preclude the application of state arbitration law, even in interstate arbitration cases, provided the state law is not inconsistent with the FAA.11 But when is a state law inconsistent with
the FAA? The Hall Street Associates decision 12 creates something of a puzzle in this regard. If the FAA is so offended by
party agreements expanding the level of judicial review of
awards in vacatur that such agreements are invalid and unenforceable, may parties then achieve exactly the same result by
opting out of the FAA altogether and submitting their arbitration agreement to state law instead, as Hall Street implies they
13
may be able to do?
10. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2) (requiring written consent from all parties as a precondition for settlement by arbitration).
11. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1984).
12. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S.Ct. 1396

(2008).
13. The California Supreme Court has already so ruled. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, 190 P.3d 586, 590 n.2 (Cal. 2008) ("Because the
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Article XJV According to Article XIV of the New York
Convention, "A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail
itself of the present Convention against other Contracting
States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the
Convention."1 4 How is this provision to be understood?
Should the drafters be understood to have thereby imposed a
"secondary" reciprocity requirement? In other words, may a
State not only by declaration limit its Convention obligations
to awards rendered on the territory of another Contracting
State, but also refuse to recognize or enforce an award, even if
rendered in another Contracting State, if, under mirror-image
circumstances, a U.S. award would be denied recognition or
enforcement in that other State under its implementation of
the Convention? The article's phrasing ("a Contracting State
shall not be entitled to avail itself of the Convention against
other Contracting States") seems to contemplate a direct action by one Contracting State against another for violation of
the latter's New York Convention obligations. But might the
absence of such "secondary" reciprocity also be raised in the
context of a private party's attempt to have a Convention
15
award recognized or enforced?
Effect and Weight of PriorDeterminations. The example that
perhaps best typifies the kinds of uncertainties in international
commercial arbitration that a Restatement in the field might
hope to address is the question of the effect and weight of
prior judicial determinations of issues recurring over the life
of an arbitration. It is inherent in the staged life-cycle of arbitration that a number of fundamental questions are apt to surface repeatedly at various moments over the course of an arbitration's lifetime. Did an arbitration agreement come into being? Is a given person a party to that agreement? Is the
parties proceeded in state court under the CAA, we conclude that judicial
review of the award is governed by state law, though the arbitration proceedings are governed by federal procedural law and AAA rules under the terms
of the contract.").
14. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. XIV, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
15. On this issue, the arbitration literature is divided. Compare Leonard
V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1074
(1961), with GARY B. BoRN, supra note 8, at 2393-94.
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agreement for any reason invalid or unenforceable? Have the
various contractual preconditions, if any, to trigger enforcement of the arbitration agreement been satisfied? Does the
dispute at hand fall within the scope of disputes subject to the
agreement to arbitrate? Is the kind of dispute at hand one
that is legally capable of being arbitrated in the first place?
These issues-sometimes crudely lumped together as issues of "arbitrability"-may surface repeatedly over the arbitration's life-cycle, sometimes in the same court, sometimes in a
court of a differentjurisdiction. They may surface as ajurisdictional defense to a suit brought in a court of law when the
claim before the court arguably comes within the scope of the
arbitration agreement, or as a basis for seeking an order to
compel arbitration of the claim. They may surface again, after
the arbitration has already begun, when a court is asked for
one of the stated reasons to issue a stay of the arbitration on
one or more of these same grounds.
If the arbitration nevertheless proceeds and culminates in
an award, a vacatur proceeding in the place of arbitration will
provide an opportunity for the losing party to revisit each of
these questions again in an attempt to have the award set
aside. To these issues will now be added a second series of
issues relating not to the validity, enforceability, or coverage of
the agreement to arbitrate, but to aspects of the arbitral proceeding itself, including the composition of the tribunal and
the adequacy of a party's right to be heard. If no set-aside action is brought, or if one is brought but fails, may the same or
similar questions be again revisited on the occasion of the
award being presented to a court in another jurisdiction in an
action for enforcement?
A standard and tempting response would be to invoke the
judicial forum's generally applicable rules on judgment recognition. 1 6 These prior determinations are judgments after all,
whether of courts of the same jurisdiction or of another. Or,
are these issues so critical to the legitimacy of the underlying
arbitral proceedings and the resulting award that they deserve
16. In the vacatur context, see, for example, North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that an

arbitration award was improperly vacated because an earlier decision to consolidate arbitrations was not properly subject to reconsideration under the
law of the case doctrine).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2009]

U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

181

fresh consideration at each stage? Or would some intermediate solution, in the form of limited deference, be a better solution? There may also arise the converse problem: when, if at
all, and under what circumstances, may a party that had the
opportunity to raise one or more of these objections at a prior
stage in the arbitral life cycle, but failed to do so, then be
deemed estopped from doing so at a later stage? 17 Are such
objections, in short, subject to implied waiver?
Choice of Law. To virtually all the questions that I have
here raised, and others, there may be added a choice-of-law
layer of analysis. The answers to some of these questions may
so impact the effectiveness of arbitration that they call for answers drawn, if not from the language of the FAA, then from
its spirit and underlying purposes.' 8 The answers to others
may have so profoundly a procedural character as to warrant
governance by the law of the forum. 19 Still others, for reasons
of federalism or otherwise, may more properly be left to state
law, 20 whether statutory or common law in form. Choice-oflaw issues abound.

17. See, e.g., Cobec Brazilian Trading and Warehousing Corp. v. Isbrandtsen, 524 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that a party is generally
deemed to have waived an objection by failing to raise it in earlier judicial
proceedings).
18. For an example, consider burden of proof. Although the FAA is silent on the matter, courts have, based on the FAA's broad pro-arbitration
philosophy, generally placed on the party resisting recognition or enforcement the burden of establishing a ground for non-recognition and non-enforcement of an award. See, e.g., Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358
F.3d 1286, 1292 n.3 (l1th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he award is presumed to be confirmable [and the] defendant to the confirmation action can overcome this
presumption only by making one of the showings enumerated in the Convention.").
19. An example might be the availability of a forum non conveniens defense to actions to enforce a foreign arbitral award. See P&P Indus. v. Sutter
Corp., 179 F.3d 861, 870 n.6 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Often ... concerns such as
the 'first to file rule' will play a role in deciding which court, of the many
that have power to confirm the award, should in fact do so.").
20. An example would be the availability of immediate appeal from rulings granting or denying enforcement of a non-Convention award or from
state court rulings granting or denying enforcement of a Convention award.
(In federal courts, a right of immediate appeal is guaranteed by 9 U.S.C.A.
§ 16(a) (1) (D)).
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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AN
ARBITRATION RESTATEMENT

The problems just canvassed represent only a handful of
the kind that restaters of a field of law justifying a Restatement
should expect to face; otherwise a Restatement would not seriously be needed. But there exists an entire overlay of challenges that are traceable specifically to the internationalcharacter of the subject undergoing restatement. It is on these challenges that I intend at this point to dwell.
In this paper, I address four such challenges. First, to
what extent is international law a proper subject of a Restatement or similar project in the first place? Second, should the
law delineate the national and international aspects of the subject, and if so, how? Third, what are the legal "givens"-by
which I mean legal understandings that restaters cannot avoid
and to which they must accommodate themselves when restating the law-when a Restatement subject is international in
character? Fourth, and finally, how conscious should one be,
in restating the U.S. law of an international subject, of the legal principles and practices within otherjurisdictions? All four
questions reflect ways in which restating American law represents a different enterprise when that law situates itself within
a distinctly international field, as compared to the more traditional fields of ALI activity. (I use the term "more traditional,"
rather than "more usual," precisely because, with the passage
of time, treating matters of international law in ALI Restatements may no longer be described as unusual.)
A.

InternationalLaw as a Restatement Subject

Writing in 2001, ALI vice-president Conrad Harper described the early years of the American Law Institute as ones in
which reference to international law could not even be described as "episodic"; "occasional" was as much as one could
say.2 1 Even the Conflicts of Law Restatements22 -including
the Second 2 3-made at most incidental mention of the transnational aspects of conflicts ofjurisdiction and conflicts of law.
21. Michael Traynor, The President's Letter, ALI

REPORTER (Fall

2001),

available at http://ali.org/ali-old/R2401-presltr.shtm.
22. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).

23.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1971).
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In that respect, of course, the Conflicts Restatements were no
different in character than the conflicts of law scholarship of
the day.
The picture has changed markedly over the last twenty to
twenty-five years, with international law-oriented projects figuring ever more prominently on the ALI agenda. While this development has hardly been systematic, the international law initiatives of the ALI may nevertheless conveniently be divided
into three distinctive species-a fact that in itself reveals the
breadth of the "international" phenomenon.
1.

The U.S. Law of InternationalLaw

A first species, exemplified by the Restatements of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 24 is one that advances a substantive United States law position on an international law subject. That model fit perfectly the intentions of
the restaters for that project, which was to treat foreign relations law as a body of law that was as "national" as any other
body of law, its "foreign relations" subject matter notwithstanding. It comes as no surprise that the U.S. legal understanding
of international law, and public international law in particular,
is not a global understanding. While it is no secret that the
drafters of the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
sought to align U.S. understandings of international law more
closely with understandings of international law held in certain other legal and political systems, there was never any
doubt that it was U.S. understandings of international law that
were being restated or otherwise advanced. It may not be particularly convenient that international law understandings differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it should not surprise
us that they do.
While an ALI project having the ambition to set forth the
U.S. law on an international law subject may readily take the
distinctive Restatement form, that form is not the only available or appropriate one. When, for example, the ALI entered
into the arena of recognition and enforcement of foreign
country judgments, it chose to develop not a Restatement, but
24.
STATES

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

(1965);

UNITED STATES

RESTATEMENT

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
(THIRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

(1987).
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a draft federal statute on the subject. 25 Of course, a major

consideration in pursuing that strategy was the circumstance
that a Hague Convention on the subject was being developed, 26 and such an instrument, if signed and ratified by the
United States, was assumed to require federal implementing
legislation. It would have made little sense to pursue a Restatement of an international law field that promised to become
the subject of an international treaty requiring implementing
legislation.
The Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration follows the path charted by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. It will set out the U.S. law governing international commercial arbitration, and, like the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, needs to come to terms
with legal norms, whether constitutional, statutory, or treaty in
origin, that are unavoidably "American." I consider the nature
of these constitutional, statutory, and treaty "givens" more
7
2
closely below.

2.

The InternationalLaw of InternationalLaw

The mode of presenting a body of international law that I
have just described, and that will be used in the present Restatement project, is only one among several. Binding international law is being made on today's international legal landscape also under the aegis of certain distinctively international
regimes, that is, regimes whose institutions are themselves in
the business of issuing authoritative pronouncements of international law. Among these, WTO law is of special legal interest in the United States due to the combination of an international agreement (the Uruguay Round amendments) 28 and its
federal implementing legislation (the Uruguay Round amend25. ALI, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FoREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE

(2006).

26. Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Com-

mission on Oct. 30, 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal-affairs/991030forjudg.html.
27. See infra Parts 2, 3, and 4.
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1.
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ments implementation statute).29 WTO law is unquestionably
a product of the WTO's own institutions, both legislative and
judicial, even though its practical impact is limited by its not
being understood to generate individually enforceable rights
and obligations in U.S. courts. 30 Still, nothing would prevent
the ALI from commissioning a Restatement of a body of law of
this kind, and calling it a Restatement, even though what
would be restated would be the law generated by the organs of
an international organization, a "truly" international law.
When the ALI set out to address WTO law in this fashion,
' 31
it employed the term "Principles" rather than "Restatement."
One might suppose that this nomenclature reflected an assumption that the only law that an institution like the ALI can
properly "restate" is domestic U.S. law, even if domestic law
addresses an international law subject. But why should it be
that the only law the ALI can properly restate is domestic law?
The central objective of Restatements is to clarify and consolidate the law for understanding and application by U.S.
courts. 3 2 If WFTO law were understood, as it happens not to

be, to give rise to individually enforceable rights and obligations in U.S. courts, a Restatement of this field of law would be
as valuable to the judiciary as are Restatements in any other
field of law that U.S. courts have occasion to apply. I suspect
that the real reason the ALI chose to present its work on WTO
law in the form of Principles, rather than a Restatement, is that
WTO law is simply still in too nascent a stage to presume to be
restated.
Other fields that are international, in the sense of being
made by international institutions, and that could form the
subject of Principles along the lines of the ALI's Principles of
WTO law, include the international law of investor protection.
That body of law is essentially being made today by international arbitral tribunals, under the aegis of ICSID, NAFTA, or
the multitude of bilateral investment treaties in force. Use of
29. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
30. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 3512(c)(1) ("No person other than the United
States ...shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements ....").

31. ALl,
(2003).

PRINCIPLES OF TRADE LAW: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

32. See generally Hull, supra note 1.
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the term "Principles" would be as apt here as in the case of
WTO law; the understanding of even the most fundamental
norms of investor protection law-such as "fair and equitable
treatment"-cannot be considered to be anything more than
nascent.
3.

Principlesfor Addressing Cross-Border or Common Problems

A third species of ALI activity in international law includes
instruments for dealing with recurrent cross-border situations.
Such instruments neither restate a distinctively American law
on an international law subject (as in the Foreign Relations
Law Restatement) nor restate the international law on an international subject (as in the Principles of WTO law). Rather,
they seek to accomplish a quite different task, namely to foster
the development among jurisdictions of common principles
for the treatment of problems that are either "cross-border" in
nature or simply commonly experienced. Ventures of this sort
are both "more" and "less" than the Restatements and Principles just considered. They are "more" because they go beyond
what can currently claim to constitute law, but "less" because
they lack the character of law in the full sense of the word.
ALl projects of this kind reflect the emergence of what may
best be considered as a kind of "soft law." Unsurprisingly, the
term "Principles" recurs regularly in projects of this kind as
well.
The ALI prototype is the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure,3 3 an instrument produced jointly by
the ALI and Unidroit. The Transnational Principles and Rules
represent something along the lines of a model code for handling the procedural aspects of transnational litigation of civil
and commercial law disputes. While they are positive law nowhere, they may be candidates for adoption either as positive
law, as a procedural model that parties may direct international arbitrators to employ (or that arbitrators could possibly
employ without direction by the parties), or as a source of
"best practices" for courts and regulators in their application
of independently existing procedural norms. The presence in
a dispute of a "transnational" element, within the meaning of
the Principles and Rules, justifies our considering an instru33. ALl,

PRINCIPLES

AND

RULES OF

TRANSNATIONAL

CIVIL

PROCEDURE

(1998).
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ment of this kind as a third type of international ALI product.
The rationale for such a project is that truly transnational
transactions or relationships may be more effectively regulated
by instruments that have been designed for that purpose than
by bodies of law that were fashioned in a purely domestic setting.
The possibilities for this species of international law project are legion. A more recent example is the ALI's Principles
Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in
Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes. 34 The drafters
sought to distill and develop a body of principles on issues of
private international law in the intellectual property area that
might prove attractive to policymakers across jurisdictions. In
that respect, the ALI drew closer to the kind of work traditionally performed by bodies like the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 35 Unidroit,3 6 and UNCITRAL.3 7 It is

then really a small step for the ALI to move, as the Hague Conference, Unidroit, and UNCITRAL themselves have done, to
the elaboration of specific inter-jurisdictional mechanisms for
managing transnational problems. The ALI had at one point,
for example, developed Guidelines on Court-to-Court Communications in Insolvency Proceedings-38-a project that initially was limited to the NAFTA countries but that has more
recently expanded to the development of cooperative mecha39
nisms for transnational bankruptcies more generally.
A problem does not need to have a distinctively transnational element to justify the ALI considering it an interna34. ALl, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION,
CHOICE OF LAW, ANDJUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008).

35. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Oct.
9-31, 1951, 15 U.S.T. 2228, 220 U.N.T.S.121, available at http://www.hcch.
net/index en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=29.
36. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
(UNIDROIT), PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994),
available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.contract.principles.1994/
doc.html.
37. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res.
2205 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/2205 (Dec. 17, 1966).
38. ALl, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION
AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (2003).
39. Institute Moves Forward with Transnational Insolvency Project, ALl
REPORTER (Summer 2006), available at http://www.ali.org/aliold/R280407-transnationalinsolv.htm.
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tional initiative. It is true that aggregate and collective litigation in national courts more and more often involves a multinational body of claimants. But, even if it does not, the fact
remains that the effective handling of collective and aggregate
litigation is a problem challenging contemporary legal systems
across the board, even though internationality does not lie at
the core of the problem. When the ALI commissioned the
establishment of a project on the Principles of Aggregate Litigation, 40 it proceeded on the assumption that the difficulties
associated with collective and aggregate litigation are so commonly experienced in jurisdictions around the world that it
was worth launching an international effort, even in the absence of a distinctly transnational element in the underlying
scenarios. The project is meant to produce a set of principles
that legislatures around the world might observe in designing
litigation mechanisms for collective redress.
Of course, it is precisely in the context of endeavors such
as these that comparative law takes center stage. A common
search for legal solutions draws upon comparative law for inspiration, even while it equally consults comparative law for
determining the extent to which those solutions fit the legal
environments in which they may eventually be introduced. In
fact, this third species of international work is by no means
entirely new. The ALI made an early foray into this mode of
inquiry in its international human rights project of the 1940s,
which resulted in a "Statement of Essential Human Rights"-a
Statement that was never published, much less adopted, 4 1 but
that powerfully influenced the United Nations Universal Dec42
laration of Human Rights.
B. Delimiting National and InternationalLaw
The examples given above suggest how untenable it has
become to distinguish sharply between national and international law. Take the Restatement of International Commercial
Arbitration. One might want to confine the inquiry to cases in
40. ALI, Current Projects on the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?ffuseaction=projects.proj-ip&project
id=7.
41. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: 75TH ANNIVERSARY (1998).
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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which one or more elements in an arbitration are "foreign,"
i.e., in which one or both parties are foreign, the place of arbitration is foreign, the cause of action arises under foreign law
(or foreign law is otherwise applicable), the production of evidence or provisional relief that is needed is foreign, or the
award was rendered on foreign territory. But transactions that
are international in one or more of these respects may nevertheless fall squarely within the ambit of a preexisting body of
domestic law that was, however, almost certainly designed for
domestic cases.
U.S. arbitration law offers a prime example. The FAA,
which applies in principle to all the "foreign" scenarios recited
above, is the same regime that is applicable to purely domestic
interstate arbitration. On many issues, foreign arbitral awards
will be treated by U.S. courts no differently than domestic arbitral awards, and the truly voluminous FAA case law developed
for domestic cases under the FAA will bear directly on the
many fewer foreign arbitration cases. (Admittedly, on an issue
like the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, and
to a lesser extent arbitration agreements, the FAA has separate
regimes for domestic and foreign awards, with FAA Chapter
One 43 governing the former and FAA Chapters Two 4 4 and
Three 45 governing the latter, but this was due to the necessity
of statutorily implementing an international convention on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 46 )
In fact, the leading precedents regularly cited in cases concerning foreign arbitral awards-PrimaPaint,47 Southland Corporation,48 Volt, 4 9 Mastrobuono,5 0 First Options, 51 Hall Street Associates52-are cases displaying no foreign element whatsoever,
but falling within federal legislative competence, hence the
FAA, because they involved interstate, as opposed to purely intrastate, commerce. Even so, these cases are as foundational
43. FAA §§ 1-16 (2009).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at §§ 201-208.
Id. at §§ 301-307.
See New York Convention, supra note 14.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 42:175

for international arbitration in U.S. courts as they are for interstate arbitration. To that extent, the distinction between the
national and the international is largely artificial.
Of course, not all lines that one is tempted to draw in a
project like the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial Arbitration implicate the distinction between domestic and international law. For example, in the run-up to
this Restatement project, far more attention was given to the
question whether investor-State disputes should be brought
within the ambit of the project than to the question of where
domestic ends and international begins. 53 Investment arbitration, as it has developed over the past fifteen years or so, bears
many features that importantly distinguish it from standard international commercial arbitration. The State will ordinarily
not have been a party to the underlying transaction constituting the investment; the conduct of the respondent State will
almost invariably be conduct taken pursuant to its sovereign
prerogatives; the relationship between Claimant and Respondent will be treaty- rather than contract-based; the law applicable to the dispute will not be the law applicable to the underlying investment transaction, but rather the law governing investor protection under the relevant international agreement; the
pressure for transparency in what is otherwise the distinctively
non-transparent world of international commercial arbitration
(not to mention the very notion of amicus curiae briefs) is
unique to foreign investment disputes. And so on.
It might be argued that this combination of special features justifies carving investor-State disputes out of the ALI Restatement altogether. That argument alone is testament to the
high degree of differentiation and fragmentation of international law, even in a domain so seemingly unified as international arbitration. However, it was ultimately decided not to
carve out such disputes from the Restatement, largely for the
same reason, though in reverse, that it makes little sense to
ignore domestic FAA cases in dealing with the international
cases. If international commercial arbitration forms the bedrock of investor-State arbitration, it does not make a great deal
of sense to segregate the latter for entirely separate treatment.
Were the Arbitration Restatement to address substantive law,
53. George A. Bermann, Restating InternationalArbitration, 101 Am. Soc'y

Int'l L. Proc. (forthcoming 2009).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2009]

U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

191

my position would be quite different. The United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 54 and
the Unidroit Principles, 55 among other instruments, which figure prominently as the applicable law in international arbitrations arising out of sales transactions, stand worlds apart from
the investor protection principles that have been built into
NAFTA and bilateral investment treaties. But, since the Restatement will have little to say about the substantive rules of
decision to be applied in the arbitration, the distinction between investor-State and commercial arbitration bears much
less significance. The distinction does not fade away entirely;
certain procedural issues like transparency, for example, will
inevitably be treated differently. But the distinction does fade.
C.

Constraints in FashioningInternationalLaw Restatements

While Restatements of the law seek chiefly to clarify and
consolidate the law, they may also afford an occasion for some
significant reshaping of the law in one aspect or another. Yet
the latitude that restaters enjoy is limited, because every field is
populated with at least some norms that cannot, or at least are
not supposed to, be violated or ignored. I referred to these
earlier as "givens," in the sense that they must be respected
and accommodated, even by restaters. Historically, such privileged authorities have included (a) settled constitutional understandings, (b) legislation of reasonably settled meaning,
(c) international agreements of reasonably settled meaning to
which the U.S. is a party (at least those that have been statutorily implemented or are deemed to be self-executing), and (d)
reasonably settled case law of the U.S. Supreme Court (or of
state supreme courts, where state law is concerned). Some legal principles are, for the restaters, what in private international law terms would be called "mandatory."5

6

Their disre-

spect by restaters would impair the legitimacy, and certainly
the utility, of the resulting Restatement.
54. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Jan. 1,
1988, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
55. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PIvATE LAW
(UNIDROIT),

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS

(2004),

available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
56. George A. Bermann, Introduction: Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 18 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 1, 1-2 (2007).
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The first generation of Restatements, which were produced in roughly the first twenty years of the ALI's founding in
1923, and which dealt with subjects such as agency, conflict of
laws, contracts, judgments, property, restitution, security interests, torts, and trusts, suffered few constraints in this regard.
As far as the Constitution is concerned, it was assumed to have
rather little to say on these subjects. As for legislation of settled meaning, it would almost invariably have been situated at
the state level. Interestingly, the presence of one or more
pieces of state legislation on a topic falling within the ambit of
the Restatement was not thought of as getting very much in
the way of those Restatement projects. Rather, those projects
proceeded largely as if the existence of state legislation were
no impediment. This may have been due in part to traditional
notions that statutes should be construed as only narrow derogations from the common law. 5 7 It may also have been assumed that, while the courts of State A could not be expected
to follow a Restatement provision that conflicts with the enacted legislation of that State, the same Restatement provision
could nevertheless be influential in States B and C, lacking any
such conflicting legislation. Of course, were the legislature of
State B or C to intervene by enacting legislation such as State
A's, that legislation would prevail, as a matter of local law. For
their part, treaties and other international agreements had virtually nothing to say on the subjects of the early Restatements,
at least not directly. Nor, finally, was there much scope for
settled U.S. Supreme Court case law, at least not in a post-Erie
58
Railroad v. Tompkins world.

Such is the idyllic landscape on which the Restaters, at
least in retrospect, appear to have originally been deploying
their efforts. This was the case not only for the first wave of
Restatements, but also for the majority of Restatements in the
second and third series.
The U.S. law of international commercial arbitration in
the year 2009 presents a rather different picture. Admittedly,
apart from possible concerns over due process in arbitral pro57. See Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79 (1877) ("No doubt, a statute may
take away a common-law right; but there is always a presumption that the
legislature has no such intention, unless it be plainly expressed.").
58. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937) (holding
that there is "no federal general common law").
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cedure, the U.S. Constitution has rather little to say on the
subject. But the other categories of "givens" mentioned above
are very much in play. By way of legislation, there looms large
a major, if outdated, piece of federal legislation in the form of
the Federal Arbitration Act. However, as enacted in 1925, the
FAA seems almost oblivious to international arbitration, at
least as far as arbitral awards rendered abroad are concerned.
Almost incredibly, from today's vantage point, Chapter One of
the FAA contemplates arbitrations arising out of interstate and
foreign commerce, but seems to assume that all such arbitrations will be situated in the United States. The Act refers not
to recognition or enforcement of awards (terminology generally associated with foreign awards), but to their vacatur or
confirmation (terminology generally associated with domestic
awards). Were the FAA to be enacted today, it would surely
not employ such limiting language.
When Chapters Two 59 and Three 60 were added to the
FAA to implement the New York and Panama Conventions,
respectively, they expressly brought the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards within the scope of the
Act. But the Conventions invited Contracting States to declare
upon ratification that they would not be bound to recognize
or enforce foreign awards unless rendered on the territory of a
State party to the Convention, 61 and the United States, like
most other Contracting States, so declared. 62 The logical result is that awards rendered on the territory of States not parties to one of the Conventions are specifically governed
neither by Chapter One of the FAA (since not made domestically) nor by Chapters Two or Three (because not New York or
Panama Convention awards). I return to this problem below,
but the point to be made here is that the Restatement of the
U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration has to reconcile itself with national legislation such as the FAA, as they
stand, with all their idiosyncrasies and shortcomings.

59. FAA at §§ 201-208.
60. Id. at §§ 301-07.
61. New York Convention, art. 1.3; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, openedfor signatureJan. 30, 1975, OAS SER
A20 (SEPEF), 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter the Panama Convention].
62. FAA § 305.
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Arbitration statutes are found at the state level as well. According to prevailing case law, state arbitration legislation is
not categorically preempted by the FAA, though it will be inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the FAA, 6 3 and much
of this legislation, whether by its terms or impliedly, applies to
international as well as domestic arbitration. I noted above
that the early restaters, operating in essentially common law
areas such as torts, contracts, property, or agency, proceeded
as if free to take little or no account of existing state laws. But
the situation may well be different when a Restatement intervenes in a field in which Congress has already enacted important legislation. Such a Restatement effectively builds a kind
of federal common law of statutory interpretation, and in so
doing poses a much more substantial threat to state law, if only
because the capacity of state law to reassert itself legislatively
will depend upon the state of federal preemption in the area
of law in question.
Assuming the FAA does not occupy the international arbitration field to the exclusion of state law, but rather permits
resort to state arbitration law to the extent not inconsistent
with the FAA, how is "inconsistency" with the FAA to be ascertained? If the FAA places a ceiling on the grounds available
for vacatur of local awards, or on the grounds for denying recognition or enforcement of foreign awards, does that mean

that the parties may have no resort to state law that permits
more searching review? This is precisely the question on
which the Supreme Court's recent Hall Street Associates decision64 has managed to send profoundly mixed signals. In sum,
drafters of a Restatement, entering upon the international
commercial arbitration field, find themselves in anything but
the juridical vacuum in which the early restaters somehow assumed themselves to be, whether they actually were or not.
The Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration also differs from most of the early Restatements in regard to the "givens" established by settled Supreme
63. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984).
64. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406
(2008) (holding that the statutory grounds provided by the FAA for a
prompt vacatur and modification of an arbitration agreement may not be
modified by contract, but suggesting that parties seeking a harder review
than that provided by the FAA might look to state statutory or common law,
where "judicial review of different scope is arguable").
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Court pronouncements in the field. Unlike those early Restatements, anchored as they were in state common law, this
Restatement proceeds on terrain on which the Supreme Court
has been keeping remarkably busy, up to and including the
past term, 6 5 in establishing new "givens" for the field. However one may assess the contribution that recent Supreme
Court rulings have made to clarity and coherence in the international commercial arbitration field, the fact remains that determining the extent to which the Supreme Court has "finally
settled" a point of law within the field is a feat not to be underestimated.
Finally, as already implied, international agreements occupy a place in the international commercial arbitration field
that the drafters of the early Restatements could not have
imagined, and thereby supply restaters with additional "givens." But instruments like the New York, Panama, and ICSID
conventions, 66 and the innumerable bilateral investment trea-

ties that contemplate the arbitration of foreign investment disputes, 67 also present some noteworthy gaps. As noted, the
only chapters of the FAA that deal with foreign arbitral awards
are Chapters Two and Three, implementing the New York and
Panama Conventions, respectively-and those Conventions
only. But one encounters from time to time international ar65. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009)
(addressing the issue of whether appellate courts have jurisdiction under
§ 16(a) of the FAA to review denials of stays requested by litigants who were
not parties to the relevant arbitration agreement and examining whether § 3
of the act can even mandate a stay in such circumstances); Vaden v. Discover
Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009) (holding that while a federal court may "look
through" a § 4 petition to determine whether it is predicated on a controversy that "arises under" federal law, it may not entertain a § 4 petition based
on the contents of a counter-claim when the whole controversy between the
parties does not qualify for federal court adjudication); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (holding that a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to
arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law).
66. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
67. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD],
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2006/5 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf; UNCTAD, The Entry into Force of BilateralInvestment
Treaties, UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9 (2006), available at http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf.
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bitral awards that are not Convention awards (notably because
the State where the award was made is not a contracting State
and thus fails the Convention's reciprocity requirement). Do
the awards rendered on the territory of States as commercially
significant as, say, Liechtenstein and Taiwan, which have not
ratified the New York Convention, fall between the cracks
merely because they are definitionally not Convention awards?
Should FAA Chapter One, or possibly even Chapters Two or
Three, apply to these awards on the ground that, whatever
else, such awards arise out of interstate or foreign commerce
68
and should be considered as well within the FAA's domain?
Or are these awards relegated to the vagaries of state statutory
or common law of arbitration 69-a result that may seem
archaic, but that actually obtains even today in the closely related field of the recognition and enforcement of foreign
country judgments, where we admittedly find no federal legislation, not even as rudimentary as the FAA? 70 Might we even
be prepared to take the leap of asserting that, given the prominence of federal law in the international arbitration field, a
sort of federal common law must be developed for coping with
71
this "interstitial" subcategory of international awards?
In short, it is one thing for the ALI to develop a Restatement in a purely common law field, or in one populated by
few and scattered pieces of state or federal legislation-and
quite another thing to do so where not only a broad federal
statute, but important multilateral and bilateral international
68. There is a suggestion to this effect in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill
Harbert Construction Co., 529 U.S. 193, 203 (2000) and in San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 799 (9th Cir.
1961).
69. For a suggestion to this effect, see Weizmann Inst. of Science v. Neschis,
421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The Convention does not appear
to preempt all other law governing the recognition of foreign arbitral awards
or to bar the recognition of awards not falling under the Convention .... ").
70. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (in
diversity cases, federal courts apply the conflict of laws rules of the state in
which they sit).
71. For a suggestion to this effect, see Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 2007) ("We believe
that this overarching federal concern with the uniformity of treatment of
international arbitration agreements requires that the issue before us be resolved by a federal common law rule, rather than by a state rule of decision.").
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conventions dominate the field. One cannot help but be
struck by the number of issues that, at least in the case of these
non-Convention awards, are potentially governed by one or
another "residual" body of law. On some issues, like the availability of a sovereign immunity defense to enforcement or the
applicability of the act of state doctrine, the case for a federal
law rule is quite powerful. On others-such as the availability
of forum non conveniens as a basis for stay or dismissal of an
enforcement action, of summary procedures, or of appeals
from rulings on recognition or enforcement-the notion of
borrowing forum law makes a great deal more sense. On still
others-like the grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement of awards, the burden of proof of the grounds, the
reciprocity requirement, and the effectiveness of party agreements for expanded or lessened review as compared with the
FAA standard-there is a contest between the residual application of state and common law, on the one hand, and a more
free-wheeling resort to an FAA-based body of federal common
law, on the other.
D.

The Relevance of Foreign Law

A remaining question of special interest to an international law Restatement is the proper role of foreign law in such
an enterprise.
A subject does not of course need to be international in
character in order for foreign law to serve the usual range of
comparative law purposes. Among the purposes comparative
law serves is a better appreciation of one's own law as it stands
and a wider opening to the ways in which it might be improved. No area of the law-even those that were the Restatements' earliest terrains and that were decidedly domestic in
orientation-is beyond the reach of these core comparative
law purposes. But when a subject is international in character,
as international commercial arbitration assuredly is, foreign
and comparative law may be doubly instructive. They stand to
confer their usual benefits in the restaters' consideration of
the substance and content of the law being restated, but at the
same time help equip restaters to address the "interface" of
legal systems that every truly international subject entails in a
legally globalized world.
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The interface aspects of international commercial arbitration are obvious, for international commercial arbitration simply does not "belong" to any single jurisdiction. One need not
assert some overarching "anationality" 72 of international arbitration in order to appreciate this fact. The following scenarios, among many others, make the point:
" A court of country A compels arbitration of a dispute in
country B, fully recognizing that the courts of country B
may consider the dispute not legally arbitrable and even
choose to enjoin the arbitration or vacate the resulting
award.
* The courts of country C set aside an award, knowing
that the courts of country D may nevertheless choose to
recognize and enforce the award if they consider country C's reasons for setting aside the award to be insular
or idiosyncratic.
* The law of country E may permit the use of arbitral procedures that the law of country F considers to be fundamentally unfair, so much so as to cause a court of country F to withhold recognition from the award.
" Country G may be willing for its courts in principle to
afford provisional relief in relation to arbitral proceedings elsewhere, but not when the tribunal sitting in
country H is entertaining a claim that the courts of
country G consider to be within country G's exclusive
jurisdiction or violative of country G's notion of international public policy.
" The law of country I must decide whether its pro-arbitration policy is so emphatic as to justify the issuance of
an anti-suit injunction targeting actions in the courts of
country J whose pendency the courts of country I consider to be in violation of the agreement to arbitrate.
* The courts of country K must decide, when asked to
deny enforcement to an award rendered in country L,
how much weight to give to the prior decisions of the
courts of country L that the award should not be vacated, or to the prior decisions of country M, whose
courts had decided to compel arbitration in the first
place.
72. See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, The Rise of TransnationalLegal
Practice and the Task of ComparativeLaw, 75 TuL. L. REV. 1215 (2001).
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The point is this: the proper functioning of international
commercial arbitration depends on the legal principles and
practices of multiple legal orders. A Restatement of the U.S.
Law of International Commercial Arbitration accordingly cannot fully achieve its purposes unless it considers the multiple
points at which this body of law and the arbitration law of
other jurisdictions interface. That aspect of the challenge,
more than any other, reveals international commercial arbitration's distinctive multi-jurisdictional dependency.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

